The Heavy Burden of History Haunts Russia

25 December 2012 | Issue 5042

ByThomas Owen

Klipping The Moscow Times

The burden of history weighs heavily on Russia. It is both striking and symptomatic how often current affairs tend to be interpreted through the lens of prior experience. And at times, the perspective back in time can be long indeed. The reason this may be problematic rests in a risk that living in history may produce such a firm grip on the mind that it interferes with current decision-making.
Economic theories of "path dependence" focus on cases where the search for solutions to current problems is made hostage to decisions made in the past. Ranging from choices of technology to spatial location, they suggest that superior alternatives are available but not attainable.
Making a similar case for socio-economic development entails demonstrating that potentially beneficial policy interventions and reforms are blocked, or distorted, by historically determined values, beliefs and expectations. While making this case is both complex and controversial, the evidence suggests that the travails of attempted Russian reforms cannot be explained without reference to the past.
Even a casual glance at Russian history will show that certain institutional patterns tend to be repeated over time. At regular intervals, there are attempts to break with the past, but to date, such attempts have produced only a highly distinctive pendulum movement of reform, repression or restoration.
The core feature of patterns thus repeated is that of unaccountable government. Numerous labels have been used to describe Russia's arguably distinctive mode of government, which has ranged from autocracy to totalitarianism to the current "democracy with adjectives." Beyond the labels, the bottom line is that rulers recognize no effective constraints on their exercise of power.
In Imperial Russia, it was even codified that the emperor was accountable only to God. During the Soviet era, the Communist Party leadership remained above the law. In post-Soviet Russia, formal institutions of accountability have been introduced, paving the way for democratic governance. But as recent events have shown, the substance of actual accountability remains lacking.
Unaccountable government in turn requires that subjects must not have enforceable rights. Russian historiography is replete with illustrations of how Russia has failed to emulate the main lesson of the ancient Roman jurists — namely, that a line must be drawn between the power of states and the rights of individuals to property. The consequences go beyond inherently weak property rights protection.
The suppression of individual rights is, quite simply, essential to maintaining unaccountable power. Subjects must learn that they do not have rights that are enforceable against the ruler. Preferably, they shall also be convinced that this is both just and legitimate.
The implications for economic performance are considerable. A rules-based market economy depends crucially on credible enforcement by government of contractual rights and obligations. If this fails, economic actors will be forced instead to secure their own contracts via informal means. This implies investment in skills in playing influence games. The historical record is again highly suggestive.
The boyars of Muscovy were obsessed with their places in society. The "table of ranks" introduced by Peter the Great formalized a mode of state control over appointments, which was continued in the infamous Soviet nomenklatura.
During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, the system became fluid. But the emergence of the "oligarchs" demonstrated that closeness to the ruler remained the key to success. And the post-Yeltsin era has provided ample illustration of the resilience of patronage and dependency. The resulting culture of impunity is deeply corrosive both to the rule of law and to trust in government.
Turning to implications for current decision-making, it may be argued that what has been said above represents little more than pattern recognition. The persistent repetition of certain types of institutional solutions may be interesting to watch. But in accordance with the logic of the neoclassical economic tradition, it has no relevance to present and future policy. "Homo economicus" will always be instrumentally rational and forward-looking.
We may refer to this belief as "normative liberalism," a troublesome reluctance or even refusal to recognize the role of such institutional specificity, which derives from the tenacity of historically determined values, beliefs and expectations. Institutional theory holds that if the informal institutions that underpin good economic performance are not present, changes in formal rules cannot and will not have the desired consequences.
The problem for economics in this respect is that the context of an economic transaction will always be a dense environment of values, beliefs and expectations that are embedded in complex systems of informal norms. In situations of routine decision-making, this may not matter much. But in times of broad institutional transformation, it does. And if we do not understand the roles and origins of informal norms, then we will not be able to predict how economic agents will respond to opportunity.
The main reason the burden of history weighs so heavily on Russia is that the patterns outlined above have proved to be not only resilient but also strongly interlinked. A successful transition to the ideal of a rules-based market economy requires that the government make a credible commitment to acting as an impartial third-party enforcer. If it refuses to accept accountability, this will not work. If individuals do not believe that they have rights, there will be no countervailing force to ensure that accountability can be enforced.
The economics literature on constitutional binding of rulers underscores that success requires that subjects have a set of shared beliefs that collective action to counter government transgressions is meaningful. This is where events over the past year must be viewed as particularly important. The slogan used in many Moscow rallies — "We are not cattle!" — indicates that a shift in the collective mindset is under way.
The rapid rise in Internet penetration and the associated explosion in social media have dissipated pluralist ignorance and fueled growing anger with the regime. They have also produced a sense of empowerment and the emergence of social norms that shame those who do not join in rallies and stand up for citizens' rights. Opinion polls also show that demands are being made for public goods that have been scarcely available, such as the rule of law and a clean police force.
This is arguably the first time in Russian history that pressure for change has emanated from below, from members of an emerging civil society who are bent on collective action in support of their demands. A response to this challenge must be formulated, and its nature will determine how Russia evolves over the coming decade.
There may be good news, but the downside is that if current hopes and expectations turn out to be unfounded, then the burden of history may well prove to be crushing.

Thomas Owen, a historian and associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at -Harvard University, is author of "Dilemmas of Russian Capitalism: Fedor Chizhov and Corporate Enterprise in the Railroad Age." This comment appeared in Vedomosti.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-heavy-burden-of-history-haunts-russia/473561.html#ixzz2GKWEPRGS
The Moscow Times

12 Reasons Why Russia Is a Great Investment

04 December 2012 | Issue 5028

ByDaniel Thorniley

Klipping The Moscow Times

It seems that more bad news is written and spoken about Russia than about any other country. How many times have you heard that if you do business in Russia, you will lose all your money because your business partner will steal it from you? Or that you have a good chance of being killed if you visit Moscow because the Russian mafia will murder you in your hotel room?
In reality, Russia is a key market in any global or European corporate strategy, and here are 12 reasons why:
1. Russia is the largest market in Europe, with 142 million people. Contrary to popular opinion, Russia will not be empty of people in 30 years. The demographic trends have improved in the past decade. If current trends continue in the next 10 years, then by 2022 the average Russian man will be living longer than the average white American male without a university education.
2. Russia is pulling away from continental Europe in terms of growth in gross domestic product. Over the next five years, eurozone GDP growth is expected to be on average 1 percent, and the U.S. is expected to have 2.3 percent growth in GDP. Meanwhile, Russia's economy will expand about 4 percent, provided that oil stays above $95 per barrel. In terms of GDP slowdown in 2012, Russia has managed better than all the BRICs and Turkey, and per capita GDP is much higher than that of China and India.
3. Russia ranks among the top three profit markets in the world. Russian consumers understand quality and will pay for it. The return on equity in Russia across some sectors in 2012 (chemical, metals, transportation) exceeds that in Europe by roughly 70 percent.
4. Russia is Europe's second-largest automotive market, with 2.7 million euros in car sales in 2011, behind only Germany, with 3.1 million.
5. Russia will be the largest consumer products market in Europe in 2024.
6. It is the largest mobile phone market in Europe today, with a saturation of 230 million phones, compared with 100 million in Germany.
7. Based on the threshold of $15,000 annual household income as the standard for defining the middle class in emerging countries, in Russia, 55 percent of households are middle class, whereas this figure is only 21 percent in China, 11 percent in India and 30 percent in Brazil. What's more, wealthy households are more predominant in Russia compared with other BRIC countries, with 15 percent having incomes of more than $50,000. In China, it is a mere 2 percent, while it is barely 1 percent in India and just 5 percent in Brazil.
8. Russia ranks among the lowest in the world for household debt: 8 percent of GDP. The Western average is 90 percent. In addition, Russia's government debt is also low, at 7 percent.
9. Russia holds the third-largest hard currency reserves in the world, at $510 billion.
10. The unemployment rate, at 5.4 percent, is one of the lowest in Europe.
11. Russian human resources are among the most educated and qualified in the world.
12. Russia is one of the very few markets in the world where companies in the right sector can grow at 20 percent per year for years on end. Russia consistently ranks high in terms of sales growth in Europe. For example, Russia is the largest market for -Danone and the second largest for -PepsiCo.
Let's hope new investors considering the Russian market will look past the headlines and see the tremendous opportunities the country offers.

Daniel Thorniley is president of DT-Global Business Consulting in Vienna.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/12-reasons-why-russia-is-a-great-investment/472501.html#ixzz2G9FJY8ER
The Moscow Times

The Heavy Burden of History Haunts Russia

25 December 2012 | Issue 5042

ByThomas Owen

Klipping The Moscow Times

The burden of history weighs heavily on Russia. It is both striking and symptomatic how often current affairs tend to be interpreted through the lens of prior experience. And at times, the perspective back in time can be long indeed. The reason this may be problematic rests in a risk that living in history may produce such a firm grip on the mind that it interferes with current decision-making.
Economic theories of "path dependence" focus on cases where the search for solutions to current problems is made hostage to decisions made in the past. Ranging from choices of technology to spatial location, they suggest that superior alternatives are available but not attainable.
Making a similar case for socio-economic development entails demonstrating that potentially beneficial policy interventions and reforms are blocked, or distorted, by historically determined values, beliefs and expectations. While making this case is both complex and controversial, the evidence suggests that the travails of attempted Russian reforms cannot be explained without reference to the past.
Even a casual glance at Russian history will show that certain institutional patterns tend to be repeated over time. At regular intervals, there are attempts to break with the past, but to date, such attempts have produced only a highly distinctive pendulum movement of reform, repression or restoration.
The core feature of patterns thus repeated is that of unaccountable government. Numerous labels have been used to describe Russia's arguably distinctive mode of government, which has ranged from autocracy to totalitarianism to the current "democracy with adjectives." Beyond the labels, the bottom line is that rulers recognize no effective constraints on their exercise of power.
In Imperial Russia, it was even codified that the emperor was accountable only to God. During the Soviet era, the Communist Party leadership remained above the law. In post-Soviet Russia, formal institutions of accountability have been introduced, paving the way for democratic governance. But as recent events have shown, the substance of actual accountability remains lacking.
Unaccountable government in turn requires that subjects must not have enforceable rights. Russian historiography is replete with illustrations of how Russia has failed to emulate the main lesson of the ancient Roman jurists — namely, that a line must be drawn between the power of states and the rights of individuals to property. The consequences go beyond inherently weak property rights protection.
The suppression of individual rights is, quite simply, essential to maintaining unaccountable power. Subjects must learn that they do not have rights that are enforceable against the ruler. Preferably, they shall also be convinced that this is both just and legitimate.
The implications for economic performance are considerable. A rules-based market economy depends crucially on credible enforcement by government of contractual rights and obligations. If this fails, economic actors will be forced instead to secure their own contracts via informal means. This implies investment in skills in playing influence games. The historical record is again highly suggestive.
The boyars of Muscovy were obsessed with their places in society. The "table of ranks" introduced by Peter the Great formalized a mode of state control over appointments, which was continued in the infamous Soviet nomenklatura.
During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, the system became fluid. But the emergence of the "oligarchs" demonstrated that closeness to the ruler remained the key to success. And the post-Yeltsin era has provided ample illustration of the resilience of patronage and dependency. The resulting culture of impunity is deeply corrosive both to the rule of law and to trust in government.
Turning to implications for current decision-making, it may be argued that what has been said above represents little more than pattern recognition. The persistent repetition of certain types of institutional solutions may be interesting to watch. But in accordance with the logic of the neoclassical economic tradition, it has no relevance to present and future policy. "Homo economicus" will always be instrumentally rational and forward-looking.
We may refer to this belief as "normative liberalism," a troublesome reluctance or even refusal to recognize the role of such institutional specificity, which derives from the tenacity of historically determined values, beliefs and expectations. Institutional theory holds that if the informal institutions that underpin good economic performance are not present, changes in formal rules cannot and will not have the desired consequences.
The problem for economics in this respect is that the context of an economic transaction will always be a dense environment of values, beliefs and expectations that are embedded in complex systems of informal norms. In situations of routine decision-making, this may not matter much. But in times of broad institutional transformation, it does. And if we do not understand the roles and origins of informal norms, then we will not be able to predict how economic agents will respond to opportunity.
The main reason the burden of history weighs so heavily on Russia is that the patterns outlined above have proved to be not only resilient but also strongly interlinked. A successful transition to the ideal of a rules-based market economy requires that the government make a credible commitment to acting as an impartial third-party enforcer. If it refuses to accept accountability, this will not work. If individuals do not believe that they have rights, there will be no countervailing force to ensure that accountability can be enforced.
The economics literature on constitutional binding of rulers underscores that success requires that subjects have a set of shared beliefs that collective action to counter government transgressions is meaningful. This is where events over the past year must be viewed as particularly important. The slogan used in many Moscow rallies — "We are not cattle!" — indicates that a shift in the collective mindset is under way.
The rapid rise in Internet penetration and the associated explosion in social media have dissipated pluralist ignorance and fueled growing anger with the regime. They have also produced a sense of empowerment and the emergence of social norms that shame those who do not join in rallies and stand up for citizens' rights. Opinion polls also show that demands are being made for public goods that have been scarcely available, such as the rule of law and a clean police force.
This is arguably the first time in Russian history that pressure for change has emanated from below, from members of an emerging civil society who are bent on collective action in support of their demands. A response to this challenge must be formulated, and its nature will determine how Russia evolves over the coming decade.
There may be good news, but the downside is that if current hopes and expectations turn out to be unfounded, then the burden of history may well prove to be crushing.

Thomas Owen, a historian and associate of the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at -Harvard University, is author of "Dilemmas of Russian Capitalism: Fedor Chizhov and Corporate Enterprise in the Railroad Age." This comment appeared in Vedomosti.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-heavy-burden-of-history-haunts-russia/473561.html#ixzz2G9EniFQN
The Moscow Times

The Maturing of a Market

20 December 2012 | Issue 5039

ByJames Beadle

Klipping The Moscow Times

This has been an odd year for investors. The market has ultimately managed healthy gains, and bonds have performed well. But even so, old Russia hands are probably disappointed. After so many years of astounding out-performance, both up and down, 2012 stands out as the year in which the Russian equity market reached adulthood. No more adrenaline rushes as the MICEX turned 20 and promptly entered corporate matrimony with the younger, but more future-oriented, RTS. What will happen next in this exciting epic of economic evolution?
Russia has put its go-go teenage years behind it. Annualized index volatility has slumped to 19 percent, the lowest on record, and 2012 returns will ultimately disappoint many accustomed to fast and easy money. Investors need to accept that a new level of maturity will be required to negotiate the market's challenging third decade of existence. There is good news though. The Russian financial sector is on course to mature into a respectable and productive young adult, efficiently intermediating between investors and companies with a wide range of interests. Despite some impressive developments in 2012, the high and rising equity risk premium tells us that there is plenty more exciting work ahead.
Technically, the RTS and the MICEX finalized their merger in 2011, but the integration took place only this year, culminating in the upcoming adjustment of the MICEX Index to include the same 50 names as the RTS. At last, Russia will have real volume trading in an index that is investable and reflects more than just the biggest blue chips. The formation of a central depository was an equally important event. But the infrastructure development of greatest importance is surely the subsequent opening of the ruble debt market to international investors. By early 2013, global investors will have easy access to a diverse array of locally traded ruble bonds. This development will bring immediate benefits to corporations, Russia's capital account and the global investor community. It may also rapidly have the knock-on affect of improving corporate governance and regulation. Managers should quickly notice that the best-behaved companies borrow at the best rates.
Elsewhere, the government won accolades for the decision to reinstate budget constraints against fiscal largesse, talked tough on corruption, implemented impressive dividend policies and defined ambitious modernization plans with clear milestones to allow independent monitoring of progress. The Central Bank also rose to the occasion, pursuing the path to inflation-targeting and playing a considerable role in one of the ruble's most stable years to date. The country's top billionaires, too, contributed, with concerted efforts to resolve several long-standing conflicts. Not least, the end of the TNK-BP saga lifts a substantial blight overshadowing the whole equity market, and the signs are good thatNorilsk Nickelwill pursue a clear and profit-oriented strategy going forward. Let's also not forget that Russia finally joined the World Trade Organization in late August.
If all appears to be well and good, why is the equity risk premium rising, and why is Russia's discount to its peers so high? The answer to both these questions can be found in the difficult transition from communist superpower to modern capitalist state. The government is talking the talk, but next year more than ever it will need to walk the walk.
At the top of the list, countries need a fair, independent judicial system to enjoy low costs of capital and sustainable global capital in flows. What's more, one-party systems always make investors nervous about long-term projects.
But perhaps the most urgent item on the list is the need for a cogent macroeconomic policy. It doesn't only define the path forward, it is also essential for consolidating the progress already achieved. The government has correctly acknowledged that the old economic model is broken. Despite the probability of healthy global growth in 2013, Russia runs the risk of missing the party. Commodities prices are unlikely to rise like they did in the pre-crisis era, and Russia remains a resource-dependent economy. Slower retail sector expansion this year, coupled with soaring household borrowing, should raise concerns. Next year's growth will come from investment or nothing.
It is true that for the time being, the government can provide the capital that the private sector is so nervous about deploying, especially as returns on investment appear to be declining while risk lingers at an elevated level. But this is not a sustainable solution. First, the state sector is already far too large and is struggling to shrink itself. Second, the government is notoriously bad at economically efficient capital allocation. Third, the state simply lacks the funds to keep funding huge projects year after year. Government projects might get the ball rolling, but for Russia to resume healthy growth it is going to need to meet its qualitative development milestones. That will require the bureaucratic elite to do more than just talk the talk.
Russia's financial market is growing up fast before our eyes. But 2013 will determine whether it becomes an organized and responsible member of the global economic community, or whether at this sensitive young age it becomes easily distracted and runs off the rails. We all have a responsibility to play our part in stewarding it to a successful middle age.

James Beadle, who has 12 years experience dealing with the Russian market, is a senior investment adviser at Societe Generale Private Banking, Monaco.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/the-maturing-of-a-market/473397.html#ixzz2G9EFEE00
The Moscow Times

Kremlin, India Strike Weapons Deals

25 December 2012 | Issue 5043

ByAnatoly Medetsky

Klipping The Moscow Times

Grigory Dukor / Reuters

Putin and Singh arriving for a signing ceremony in New Delhi, where arms deals worth $2.9 billion were clinched.

India on Monday agreed to buy $2.9 billion worth of Russian weapons, as PresidentVladimir Putinvisited the longtime ally.
Under the larger deal, India will purchase kits to assemble 42 Sukhoi-30 fighter jets for $1.6 billion. The other contract is for 71 Mi-17 helicopters worth $1.3 billion.
"We agreed to strengthen the partnership of Russia and India in the area of military equipment cooperation further and advance new projects, including by creating joint ventures and transferring technology," Putin said after his talks with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
The fighter jet deal brought the total number of Sukhoi-30 warplanes sold to India to 230, with a total value of $8.5 billion, Interfax reported.
India's HAL Corp. plans to build 140 of these jets by the end of 2015.
"Russia is a key partner in our efforts to modernize our armed forces," Singh said in a statement.
As far as helicopters go, India has already been taking delivery of Mi-17s under a previous contract. Signed in 2008, it stipulates that Russia will supply 80 helicopters worth $1.3 billion.
India has been Russia's largest customer for military hardware, despite missed deadlines that sent New Delhi shopping for Western weapons more often.
In one such delay, Russia this year again postponed delivery of an aircraft carrier to the Indian navy, saying it will be ready in November.
"It's clear that because New Delhi has plotted a course for diversification of weapons suppliers, the competitive battle is escalating," Russia's ambassador to India, Alexander Kadakin, said in an interview posted on the Foreign Ministry's website Monday. "Russia is ready for this."
Yet it appeared that the deals announced Monday fell short of expectations. Russian defense industry sources had said Putin's visit to New Delhi would likely produce agreements for the sale of military equipment worth more than $7.5 billion.
In other business, the government's Russian Direct Investment Fund and the State Bank of India agreed to set up a joint fund.
 The fund could invest up to $2 billion in projects that seek to develop trade and economic cooperation between the countries.
Indian state oil companies have also expressed interest in acquiring stakes in Russian projects, according to the joint statement on the outcome of Putin's visit.
In addition, it said India wants to buy Russian oil and liquefied natural gas.
n Multi-industry conglomerateSistemaexpects an out-of-court resolution of a dispute over its subsidiary's loss of a license in India, Sistema's principal owner,Vladimir Yevtushenkov, said as he accompanied Putin on the visit.
India's Supreme Court on Feb. 2 revoked 122 wireless-services licenses issued in 2008, including those of Sistema Shyam Teleservices, for which the carrier had paid about $600 million.
The ruling followed an investigation begun in the second half of 2010 into violations in the distribution of frequencies.
In May, Sistema Shyam Teleservices asked the Supreme Court to reconsider the decision to revoke the licenses.
Sistema owns 56.7 percent of the company, and the Russian State Property Agency owns 17 percent. The rest belongs to India's Shyam Group.
Related articles:

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/kremlin-india-strike-weapons-deals/473594.html#ixzz2G9DPP4Yq
The Moscow Times

Beware of Selling to China

10 December 2012 | Issue 5031

ByHarry Kazianis

Klipping The Moscow Times

Over the last several weeks, news reports have suggested that China and Russia are once again nearing an agreement on a Chinese purchase of 24 advanced Su-35 fighter jets. Many analysts consider the aircraft among the world's most advanced fighters.
On the surface, this deal seems like a win-win for both parties. Russia gains a much-needed customer, while China gains access to some of the world's best defense technology. This sale would have long- term ramifications for both parties.
Russia would be wise to look to the recent past, which offers clues showing why a sale to China would be a foolish mistake. The last major aircraft deal between Moscow and Beijing involved the Su-27 Flanker in the 1990s. Russia hadn't sold technological advanced military hardware to Beijing since the so-called Sino-Soviet split, when a rise in tensions sparked border clashes in 1969.
When the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991, the Russian arms industry was struggling to survive. Russia was overflowing with weaponry that could help the Chinese jump ahead generations, so a partnership appeared to make sense for both nations.
For China, gaining access to state-of-the art defense technology was of vital importance. Chinese strategists were stunned at the speed at which the U.S. was able to overwhelm Iraqi armed forces in the 1990-91 Gulf War. Chinese strategists realized that much of their weaponry was obsolete in the face of U.S. high-precision munitions, stealth bombers and advanced fighter aircraft. Russian technology could provide a much-needed boost toward modernization.
In 1996, China and Russia deepened their partnership. Beijing paid about $2.5 billion for a license to manufacture an additional 200 Su-27s at the Shenyang Aircraft Co. in China. The contract had an important provision: The Chinese version of the aircraft, which included imported and advanced Russian avionics, radar and engines, couldn't be exported. The provision presumably protected Russia from competition in the international arms market from its own technology.
Unfortunately for Russia, the deal was not completed. After building 100 or so jets, China canceled the contract in 2004. Beijing said the planes no longer met its specifications. Three years later, China tore the agreement to shreds when it developed a new fighter aircraft, the -J-11B. The plane looked like an exact copy of the Su-27. China denies that it copied the plane, saying that it used 90 percent indigenous parts and that it developed superior domestic avionics and radar equipment.
Having been deceived once before, Russia has much more to lose going forward. Russia would be selling a small amount of fighters, just 24, in a deal that is believed to be worth $1.5 billion to $2 billion. The proposed agreement would transfer some of the world's most advanced fighter technology to an export competitor. Considering the cost of developing such an advanced fighter, China would gain access to a treasure trove of information that would once again allow it  to create a domestically created version for export. Russia would once again be handing its best technology to China, and that technology could be used in competition for lucrative defense contracts.
Russia and China are also hard at work on fifth-generation fighters, which require highly advanced engines. Many defense analysts have concluded that China has thus far been unable to produce an engine needed capable of powering a stealth aircraft that could compete with U.S. planes like the F-35. Access to Russian engine technology could provide the technological infusion needed to bridge the gap.
Beyond technology transfers and export sales, Moscow must look to its own strategic self interest. While ties between both nations at present are cordial, they have had strained relations throughout their history. Selling such highly sophisticated technology to a nation that someday could be a competitor in the Asia-Pacific region would be a big mistake. Looking at the long term, both sides may see each other as regional competitors, and Beijing's influence is growing. Russia would then face an adversary that possesses highly sophisticated military technology that it helped develop.
Russia would gain very little in selling its best defense technology to China. It is a lesson it learned once before. It does not need to repeat the same mistake.

Harry Kazianis is a WSD-Handa fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. He is also editor of TheDiplomat.com.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/beware-of-selling-to-china/472809.html#ixzz2EdsHqsJ4
The Moscow Times

Georgia Isn't on the MAP For NATO Membership

10 December 2012 | Issue 5031

ByPaul Rimple

Klipping The Moscow Times

It should come as no surprise that Georgia did not make it to -NATO's Membership Action Plan, or MAP, this year. PresidentMikheil Saakashvilihas put the blame on Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili — a convenient excuse if it were true.
After a meeting of NATO foreign ministers last week in Brussels, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen again reiterated that Georgia passed "an important test" after October's parliamentary elections.
But NATO has now given Georgia a new test to pass in 2013, when the country elects a new president. MAP was not discussed at this meeting. Nevertheless, on Thursday, Saakashvili said Georgia had a chance to gain MAP but had failed because of certain "events of recent months."
Are we to assume that if Saakashvili's party had won the elections, Georgia would be part of the MAP today? Rasmussen answered that question when he restated the old song and dance about there being "more work to be done," such as "reforming the judiciary and strengthening the rule of law and media freedom and transparency."
Since NATO integration became a national priority in Tbilisi, the alliance's secretaries-general have continuously said more work needs to be done, while Albania, a NATO member since 2009, proves that less is more by being one of the most corrupt countries in Europe. The whole democracy thing is a dubious prerequisite. Georgia fought a war with Russia four years ago, and now Russia is occupying one-third of Georgian territory. The country is simply a liability.
Instead of saying, "Look, before you can join our club, you have to deal with your Russia issues first,"
Rasmussen talks of the challenges of cohabitation between the president and government and expresses concern that Ivanishvili's appetite for arresting representatives of Saakashvili's administration will be "perceived as political persecution." Meanwhile, Saakashvili has been busy making sure it is perceived as such. You could argue it's Saakashvili's fault that Georgia isn't on the MAP, although that wouldn't be entirely correct.
Ivanishvili is betting that this wave of arrests will actually be an endorsement of his reformed  judiciary and a demonstration of how transparent Georgia's rule of law has become. But even if this were true, it wouldn't guarantee NATO membership. There will always be more tests for Georgia to pass until NATO decides that the alliance will benefit from having Georgia as a member.

Paul Rimple is a journalist in Tbilisi.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/georgia-isnt-on-the-map-for-nato-membership/472810.html#ixzz2EdrQB2uZ
The Moscow Times

In Istanbul, Putin Slams Missile Plan

04 December 2012 | Issue 5027

ByJonathan Earle

Klipping The Moscow Times

Tolga Bozoglu / Reuters

Putin chatting with Erdogan before their meeting in Istanbul on Monday.

PresidentVladimir Putinused his first known trip in almost two months to boost economic ties with Turkey and slam a NATO plan to place surface-to-air missiles on the Turkish-Syrian border.
The one-day visit to Istanbul also seemed to refute rumors that Putin is suffering from poor health. Speculation swirled after the Kremlin canceled a slew of foreign trips, including this one, in October and November.
Putin used the occasion to criticize a plan to use Patriot missiles to protect Turkey against airborne attacks from its war-torn neighbor Syria, such as a rocket strike that killed five in October.
Speaking at a news conference, Putin described that attack as an "accident" and said Syria is "obviously in no position to attack its neighbors," Interfax reported Monday.
Russia traditionally views foreign anti-missile batteries near its borders as a security threat, and Putin warned that the missiles could lead to escalating tensions between Turkey and Syria.
"You know, as they say, if there's a gun hanging on the wall at the beginning of the play, by the end it will absolutely be fired, and why do we need additional shots fired on the border?" he said.
NATO foreign ministers are expected to approve Turkey's request for the Patriot missile batteries at a meeting on Tuesday in Brussels.
NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen dismissed Russian fears of an escalation.
"This is a solely defensive measure that will be de-escalating," he told reporters in Brussels. "The [missiles'] purpose is to ensure the effective protection of people on Turkish territory. … The essence of the alliance is to protect."
Some described Putin's visit to Turkey as a last-ditch attempt to derail the plan.
Alexander Shumilin, a Middle East expert at the Institute for U.S. and Canadian Studies, said Putin likely traveled to Istanbul with a serious proposal, possibly including the evacuation of Syrian President Bashar Assad to Russia in exchange for Turkey rejecting the missile plan.
"If Putin didn't have any proposals for influencing the situation in Syria, why would he go to discuss this question with Erdogan?" Shumilin said Monday by telephone, referring to Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan.
There are "very persistent" rumors about Assad being evacuated to Moscow, he said. "This is one of those cases when the rumors have a strong foundation."
Russia has used its UN Security Council veto power to swat down calls for international sanctions on the Syrian government. It has also said it would honor existing weapons contracts.
But Putin denied that Russia was a "staunch defender" of the Syrian regime, saying the Russian government was worried about repeating "recent mistakes," a vague reference to Libya.
An estimated 40,000 Syrians have died since mass anti-government protests began in March 2011 and later evolved into a civil war.
Russia and Turkey will continue to discuss the Syrian conflict, Putin said, stressing that the two sides shared a concern for a growing humanitarian crisis in the country.
Putin's visit also saw the signing of 11 agreements on trade, energy, finance, banking and other issues.
Turkey and Russia's economic ties are growing rapidly, with bilateral trade of $32 billion last year, a figure Putin and Erdogan hoped would jump to $100 billion in a year.
Energy, construction and tourism are a lynchpin of the countries' bilateral ties. About 3.5 million Russians visited Turkey last year.
Putin is not known to have traveled since returning from an Oct. 5 visit to Tajikistan. The Kremlin subsequently canceled all visits planned for October and November, citing scheduling difficulties.
In Istanbul, he appeared somewhat rigid but showed no signs of obvious pain or discomfort, The Associated Press reported.
Staff reporter Nikolaus von Twickel contributed to this report from Brussels.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/in-istanbul-putin-slams-missile-plan/472459.html#ixzz2EM1NYmLM
The Moscow Times

Lavrov to Meet With NATO Foreign Ministers

04 December 2012 | Issue 5027

The Moscow Times

Klipping The Moscow Times

NATO

Tuesday's ministerial-level meeting of the NATO-Russia council is the first since Vladimir Putin’s return to the presidency in May.

BRUSSELS — NATO wants to re-energize its ties with Moscow during a meeting of the Western alliance's foreign ministers with their Russian counterpartSergei Lavrovon Tuesday.
It is the first ministerial-level meeting of the NATO-Russia council — which institutionalizes relations between both sides — sinceVladimir Putin's return to the presidency in May.
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said he hopes to reinvigorate cooperation with Russia.
"We have made good progress so far but need new energy to boost our relationship next year," he told reporters in Brussels on Monday.
Rasmussen announced that the alliance will offer Moscow expertise on how to safely depose of some of the country's huge ammunition stocks. "NATO has experience in recycling technology," he said.
NATO and Russia have achieved limited cooperation on Afghanistan, where Moscow has helped to carry out anti-drug raids and promised to help NATO armies to withdraw troops.
Observers are also eagerly awaiting signs of any movement in the ongoing dispute about a NATO missile shield for Europe, which the Kremlin has fiercely opposed.
But the talks over a working lunch are unlikely to be easy given the simmering dispute over Syria, which is likely to be exacerbated by NATO's plans to station patriot surface-to-air missiles on Turkey's border with Syria.
Moscow has already expressed its displeasure with such a move, saying that a military build-up is not going to make ending the bloody civil war in Syria easier.
Turkey has requested the missile deployment from its NATO allies to protect itself from the conflict spilling over the border.
Putin held talks with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Erdogan and President Abdullah GЯl in Istanbul on Monday (see story, p.1).
Related articles:

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The Moscow Times

Clinton and Lavrov Bicker Over OSCE

06 December 2012 | Issue 5030

The Moscow Tiimes

Klipping The Moscow Times

U.S. Department of State

During the recent OSCE meeting, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, pictured above at a 2011 meeting, accused each other's governments of not complying with the organization's principles.

Open disagreement between Moscow and Washington over human rights and democracy as well as intra-organization infighting overshadowed high-level talks of Europe's top security watchdog Thursday.
During a foreign ministers meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or OSCE, Foreign MinisterSergei Lavrovand U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton accused each other's governments of not complying with the organization's principles.
In his address to the meeting's plenary session in Dublin, Lavrov complained that plans to turn the organization into a security guarantor for much of the northern hemisphere were foiled by "unilateral approaches."
As a result, the OSCE is sidelined from key events, and demands for its unity "are countered with unfriendly acts," he said, according to a transcript on hisministry's website.
The minister added that conventional arms control had been "degraded" because of longstanding attempts to use arms control for political aims. Lavrov did not name any country, but NATO members, led by the United States, have staunchly resisted Moscow's wishes to increase the OSCE's regional security role, arguing that it would reduce the Western alliance's position.
Lavrov echoed comments by PresidentVladimir Putin, who said Wednesday that the OSCE must stop serving the interests of individual members. The 57-member group includes all European and former Soviet states, Mongolia, the U.S. and Canada.
Meanwhile, Clinton criticized Moscow and its key allies on human rights and called for strengthening OSCE institutions by ensuring their functioning without outside interference.
In her address, she mentioned the recent law that forces foreign-funded political NGOs to register as "foreign agents" as an example of "restrictions on civil society" in Russia, according to anofficial transcript.
During an earlier meeting with rights activists, Clinton criticized a general trend to roll back civil freedoms in Russia and other former Soviet countries.

"There is a move to re-Sovietize the region," she was quoted as saying by The Associated Press.
Lavrov, on the other hand, said Moscow was fulfilling its human rights obligations while other OSCE members were not. As an example, he pointed to police crackdowns on protests against social inequality in EU countries.
He also complained that the OSCE's election observer missions display "double standards" by sending "hundreds of observers" to some countries but only a few to others. He announced an initiative by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan to introduce new rules for election observers.
In a rare instance of institutional infighting, the OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly on Thursday criticized the organization's elections and human rights watchdog.
Assembly leader Riccardo Migliori complained in a speech to the OSCE ministers that the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights had not adhered to the organization's principles by failing to cooperate with the assembly.
As a consequence, he said, the parliamentary assembly, which consists of lawmakers from all member countries, considered a 1997cooperation agreementwith the Warsaw-based office invalid.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/clinton-and-lavrov-bicker-over-osce/472652.html#ixzz2ELzudRtq
The Moscow Times

How to Achieve Global Zero in the Middle East

05 December 2012 | Issue 5029

ByShlomo Ben Ami

Klipping The Moscow Times

Since its initiation in December 2008, Global Zero, the vision of a world without nuclear weapons, has run up against some formidable challenges. One is related to the readiness of the two major nuclear powers, Russia and the U.S., to move from the stockpile reductions to which they agreed in the New START to complete elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Others concern smaller nuclear powers' willingness to go along and whether reliable inspection, verification and enforcement systems can be put in place.
But these issues are not the real problem. Although Russia and the U.S. possess roughly 90 percent of the world's nuclear warheads, their nuclear capabilities are less of a threat than is the danger of proliferation. It is this fear of a fast--growing number of nuclear-armed states, not the fine balancing of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, that the case for Global Zero must address. Indeed, addressing the underlying security concerns that fuel nuclear competition in regional trouble spots is more important to the credibility of Global Zero's goal of "a world without nuclear weapons" than is encouraging exemplary behavior by the two major nuclear powers.
After all, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran and Israel might not be particularly impressed by a reduction in the U.S. and Russian nuclear-weapons stockpiles from gross overkill to merely mild overkill. There is a stark lack of synchrony between the relative improvement in the bilateral relations of the two major nuclear powers' and conditions in volatile regions around the world.
This gap is bound to negatively affect the processes of nuclear disarmament that are now being envisaged. These states' flirtation with nuclear weapons is not just a quest for prestige or status. It is an attempt to counter the conventional superiority of hostile neighbors.
Consider Pakistan, for which repeated defeat at the hands of its sworn enemy, India, in conventional wars has been the catalyst for its readiness "to eat grass," as former Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto famously put it, to counter India's conventional superiority and nuclear capabilities. Today, Pakistan possesses more nuclear warheads than India does. To get to zero in this region, the conflict over Kashmir must be resolved, and India must cease being perceived by Pakistan as a threat.
Ironically, the Russian case is no different from that of Pakistan, Iran or North Korea. Notwithstanding the progress in U.S.-Russian nuclear talks, the task of minimization, let alone elimination, of nuclear weapons by the Russians will depend on a willingness to address the Kremlin's key security concern: its conventional military inferiority vis-a-vis the West.
Meanwhile, Israel's genuine, if arguably exaggerated, existential anxiety helps to explain its strategy of nuclear opacity. The prevailing perception in Israel is that of being surrounded by formidable non-nuclear threats and dangerously weakened by the poor capacity of the nation's domestic front to sustain a long conventional war. A country that in the summer of 2006 had to send a million of its citizens to underground shelters to escape massive ballistic warfare conducted by Hezbollah now faces an "Islamic awakening" that it cannot fully fathom and, with it, an ominous worsening of its strategic environment.
Nor can Israel ignore the Middle East's infamy as the only region in the world where chemical and biological weapons have been used since World War II. Iraq used them against Iran in the 1980s, Egypt used them in Yemen in the 1960s, and Iraq used them against its own Kurds in the 1988 Halabja attack.
But the cause of nuclear disarmament could advance in December, when the conference to establish a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction will be held in Helsinki. Hopefully, all states in the greater Middle East, including Israel and Iran, will attend. But the initiative must avoid unworkable shortcuts. For example, the Arab position, which addresses Israel's nuclear status outside the region's broader security context, is the best recipe for failure.
Instead, the conference needs to begin a dialogue among all stakeholders about their underlying security concerns. The lesson for the Middle East in the mutual reduction of nuclear stockpiles by the U.S. and Russia is that genuine disarmament is impossible unless preceded by an improvement in interstate relations. This is also the lesson of the other five world regions — Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Africa — that have adopted treaties establishing zones free of nuclear weapons.
Israel needs to understand that its nuclear strategy cannot be sustained forever and that Iran's challenge to its supposed nuclear monopoly is not an obsession exclusive to the Iranian leadership. A Middle East free of nuclear weapons certainly is preferable to a region with two or more nuclear-weapons states. But Iran and the Arab countries in the Middle East should assume that unless and until they normalize their relations with Israel, effective engagement with it on such vital issues will remain impossible. Peace and regional denuclearization must go hand in hand.
In December 1995, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres was not exactly opaque when he said that if given peace, Israel "would give up the atom." But Israel's current prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, cannot have it both ways, conditioning nuclear disarmament on peace while doing everything he can to stall the peace process.

Shlomo Ben Ami, a former Israeli foreign minister, is the author of "Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy." © Project Syndicate

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-to-achieve-global-zero-in-the-middle-east/472561.html#ixzz2EFrN5J75
The Moscow Times

Foreign Ministry Criticizes EU on Human Rights Ahead of Summit

05 December 2012 | Issue 5029

Reuters

Klipping The Moscow Times

The Foreign Ministry said Wednesday that respect for human rights was declining in the European Union, turning the tables once again on the West and its criticism of Moscow's rights record.
"We are seeing a certain deterioration in regard to safeguards on human rights in the EU member states," Konstantin Dolgov, the Foreign Ministry's special representative for human rights, said at a news conference. "Undoubtedly, during a financial and economic crisis, solving these problems will not become any easier."
He made his comments before leaving for Brussels to meet his EU counterpart, Stavros Lambrinidis.
European leaders have expressed concern over the jailing of members of punk band Pussy Riot, prosecutions of opposition figures and laws restricting protests and foreign-funded organizations since PresidentVladimir Putinstarted a third term in May.
Putin, who is expected to meet EU leaders later this month for a twice-yearly summit, has said the West has no right to lecture Russia on human rights or use its concerns as an instrument of political pressure.
After years of Western criticism, the Foreign Ministry issued a report on human rights in other countries for the first time last year, focusing on allegations of abuse by U.S. authorities.
Dolgov was presenting the ministry's first report dealing solely with human rights in the EU, where Russia has complained of mistreatment of Russian-born children adopted in the EU and accused some bloc members of mistreating Russian-speaking minorities.
The report also cited allegations of abusive treatment of detainees, poor prison conditions and discrimination against ethnic minorities and migrant workers.
Dolgov said the EU should take more action to combat "all this ugliness that is unfortunately taking place and continuing in the European Union members in terms of not observing human rights, not observing democratic standards and in terms of not following the rule of law."

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/foreign-ministry-criticizes-eu-on-human-rights-ahead-of-summit/472590.html#ixzz2EFqjtBfV
The Moscow Times

NATO Commitment to Georgia Still 'Solid'

05 December 2012 | Issue 5029

ByNikolaus von Twickel

Klipping The Moscow Timnes

NATO

NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen

BRUSSELS — Two months after an opposition party swept elections in Georgia, NATO on Tuesday reconfirmed its 2008 decision to treat the nation as a future member but expressed concern about its democratic development.
"Georgia's commitment to NATO is solid. And NATO's commitment to Georgia remains just as solid," the alliance's secretary-general, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, told reporters after talks with the South Caucasus country's new foreign minister, Maia Pandzhikidze, on Tuesday in Brussels.
Rasmussen added that it was important that Georgia continued to stay on the path of democratic reforms. "The challenge now is to maintain momentum," he said.
NATO member countries have expressed concern about a series of arrests of former government officials following the victory of opposition leader Bidzinia Ivanishvili in parliamentary elections in October.
Ivanishvili was subsequently elected prime minister and is currently in an uneasy cohabitation with PresidentMikheil Saakashvili.
Rasmussen said that periods of cohabitation were never easy and that it was "of utmost importance" that Georgian authorities respect the rule of law and that the arrests are not perceived as political. "We will follow the development closely," he said.
He added that Pandzhikidze assured him that the government would not interfere with the judiciary.
Latvia's foreign minister, Edgars Rinkevics, warned that Tbilisi would "lose a lot" if it deviated from democratic development.
Speaking to reporters in Brussels, Rinkevics said that many countries would come out against offering more integration to Georgia "if there are the slightest suspicions that the processes are political." He added that Georgia would see "enormous attention" by European and NATO countries on its domestic political situation in coming months.
The talks were held on the second day of a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels.
Georgia's prospective NATO membership has been the biggest thorn in the Western alliance's relations with Moscow in the past.
However, Foreign MinisterSergei Lavrovdid not mention the issue during a news briefing after a session of the NATO-Russia Council on Tuesday.
Asked about the chances of improving relations, as suggested by members of Ivanishvili's government, Lavrov said that Moscow was not opposed to this.
As examples he mentioned cultural and humanitarian ties, which he said had not been severed after 2008, when diplomatic relations were cut in the wake of the Russia-Georgia war.
Lavrov said that Moscow was prepared to allow the import of Georgian food products — banned by Moscow back in 2006 — "if they comply with Russian [quality] standards."
But he warned that there would be no compromises about the two Georgian separatist territories that Moscow recognized as independent in 2008.
"Our Georgian neighbors say they want to normalize relations while they confirm that they view South Ossetia and Abkhazia as occupied territories. Maybe this rhetoric is not helpful for beginning a dialogue," he said.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/nato-commitment-to-georgia-still-solid/472589.html#ixzz2EFqIoLKz
The Moscow Times

How Stalin Turned Russian Patriots Into Enemies

04 December 2012 | Issue 5027

ByMarilyn Murray

Klipping The Moscow Times

Time to live

They arrived early. My hand was nervous as I unlocked my small Moscow apartment. As I opened the door, it framed two elderly men with their daughters. The men's straight backs stood in contrast to their age and their past. One was tall with a gaunt face whose thick glasses made his eyes more hollow and haunting. The other was smaller with larger ears and a face that broke into a familiar smile as he held out a large jar of amber honey. I was startled that he looked so much like my father.
As a child, my father refused to speak of his childhood. When he died in 1984, I only knew that his parents had been born in Russia and lived in villages near Saratov. After the Soviet collapse, a cousin in Oklahoma contacted me with information regarding the family members who had remained in Russia. Fortunately, he was finally able to find one of our cousins named Johannes, who now lives in Osinniki in the Kemerovo region, and he began corresponding with him.
When I moved to Moscow in 2002, I had a strong desire to meet Johannes. His daughter, Mina, and a nephew, Vladimir, lived near Moscow, and after meeting with them, arrangements were made for Johannes to visit me. My nephew, Tim, would come from Krasnodar to serve as our interpreter.
Vladimir had arranged an additional surprise for this momentous day: He was able to locate another cousin, Ivan, in Izhevsk, the capital of Udmurtia. Vladimir learned that Ivan and Johannes were first cousins, lived next door to each other and were basically raised as brothers, but both had been sent to gulags in Siberia in 1941 and had no contact since that time.
Vladimir arranged for Ivan and his daughter to visit Moscow at the same time as Johannes and Mina, but this would be a surprise for both men. They met for the first time in 63 years just moments before they entered my apartment.
The men were stunned to know the other was still alive. They each had assumed the other had died in the gulag camps. Russian flew across the room for the next 12 hours as we crowded around a make-shift table with an endless supply of food and stories.
There were many tears that day as the history of what our family endured under the Soviet system was laid before us. At first Johannes and Ivan were eager to share about their wives and children and their present-day lives. But as the day progressed and shadows slipped through the windows, the mood shifted. Perhaps the cover of darkness made it safer to mention painful memories.
They began asking each other about various family members and to reminisce regarding the last time they saw each other at ages 17 and 20.
They wept as they remembered those tragic years and how frightening and confusing it was. It was early September when the Soviet police came to their village and told them they could only take a few things with them — some clothes, a few cooking utensils and a little food. Everything else had to be abandoned: homes, livestock and precious belongings representing generations of our family, who were among the first settlers of this village in 1767.
They were placed onto carts and taken to a railway station, where they were forced into box cars for a two-week journey to Siberia. There was little water and no sanitation facilities. Some villagers died along the way.
After arriving in Siberia, families were separated knowing they probably would never see each other again. Johannes and his 15-year-old brother, Peter, were sent to work in a lumber camp where the conditions were abominable. The guards were cruel and shot anyone who tried to escape or slacked off in their work.
They slept on four-level plank-beds without a mattress. Their two changes of clothes quickly became infected with lice. Once or twice a month they were deloused and allowed to wash their clothes. Their clothing and bedding were completely inadequate for Siberian winters. There was never enough food — only a small piece of bread and watery soup.
Tim whispered to me, "The word they are using to describe themselves is 'slaves.'"
Then Johannes stood up and began to share what happened to his younger brother. He grabbed the back of his thigh and said, "Every day a guard came up and grabbed us here. If there was any flesh at all between your skin and your bones, you had to work even though you were so weak you were like the walking dead. One day, the guard found no flesh at all on Peter. My brother begged to go where our mother and sister, Anna, lived in a village outside the camp."
His tears were a mirror of that horrific time as he said, "It was very cold and snowing. Peter died that night. My father had been sent to a different camp and we presumed he was dead. My youngest sister had died in Anna's arms a few months before. There was no medical treatment available. It is a miracle that any of us survived."
Ivan's story was the same, with death, starvation and brutal conditions. When World War II ended in 1945, they were not allowed to return to their village near Saratov. Johannes was forced to work underground in a mine for 25 years where the conditions were oppressive and dangerous.
The evening was already long when I asked what it was like in the village before they were sent to Siberia. My cousins answered with two words: "We starved."
The conversation then included the exceedingly traumatic times in the 1920s-30s when family members died of starvation and were executed, beaten to death and even buried alive by Soviet henchmen simply because they were hard-working farmers declared as kulaks and thus "enemies of the people."
Our family originally settled in Russia at the invitation of Catherine the Great from an area in Europe that is now Germany. Even though they had been loyal Russian citizens for 174 years, when the Nazis invaded Russia, Stalin declared them "enemies of the people." They were shipped to Siberia with an edict stating they could never again return to the village they had inhabited for almost two centuries.
Touching the survivors and learning of the extermination of my family became one of the most momentous days of my life.
Today we hear talk of "Russia for Russians," but Josef Stalin was Georgian, and Vladimir Lenin's ancestors were Chuvash, Kalmyk, Jewish, Swedish and German. So who is genuinely a Russian in this eclectic land that has more than 100 ethnic groups?
I believe citizenship is paid for by generations of people who love their land — and who pay in blood and sacrificed lives.
Marilyn Murray is an educator specializing in the treatment of trauma, abuse and deprivation, with more than 2,000 people attending her classes in Russia and other countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States over the past 10 years. Her second book, "The Murray Method," was recently released in English and Russian.

Read more:http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-stalin-turned-russian-patriots-into-enemies/472434.html#ixzz2EA2AULkn
The Moscow Times