Klipping The Moscow Times
12 July 2012
The Syrian crisis
has become the latest test of Russia's relations with the West.
Moscow's support for the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad
and its readiness to aggravate the West in pursuit
of that policy has surprised Western politicians and observers,
especially in light of the initial "conciliatory" position
that Russia took toward foreign intervention in Libya in early 2011.
Western analysts
and media have attempted to find rational explanations
for Russia's position, suggesting that its main motivation is
a desire to preserve its military base in the Syrian port
of Tartus and its profitable weapons sales to Damascus. But
these factors do not seem to play a leading role.
As the Soviet
Union's most loyal ally in the Middle East following Egypt's fall
from the Soviet orbit, Syria was probably the largest recipient
of Soviet arms among non-Warsaw Pact countries in the mid-1970s.
As a result, Syria was able to create a powerful military
for that time, equipped almost entirely with modern Soviet weaponry.
As part
of an agreement in 2005, Syria placed major orders in 2006
and 2007 with Rosoboronexport, the state arms exporter,
for the purchase of weapons worth about $4.5 billion,
and that deal continues to define Moscow's military
and technical cooperation with Damascus.
The Tartus port,
often described in the media as a "military base,"
consists of two floating docks with a couple of warehouses
and some barracks. Tartus has greater symbolic than practical significance
for the Russian Navy. It cannot serve as a base
for deploying a major naval operation in the Mediterranean,
and Russian ships in the area call on the port more as
a show of solidarity with Syria than to replenish supplies.
Losing the Tartus port would have no significant negative consequences for the Russian
Navy.
Moscow's policy toward
Damascus basically amounts to supporting the Assad regime
to prevent it from being overthrown by foreign military
intervention. This policy is based on a fairly broad consensus among
Russia's politicians, analysts and the general public. In this
context, PresidentVladimir Putinplays the familiar role of "protector
of Russia's interests" against Western meddling
and expansionism.
Of course, Putin is
also motivated by a desire to preserve his own hold
on power. His authoritarian regime also faces a growing protest
movement that receives political endorsement from the West. Putin
cannot help but sympathize with Assad as a fellow autocratic ruler who is
struggling against "outside interference in his country's internal
affairs."
But the most
influential factor is the Kremlin's firm belief that Russia cannot afford
to "lose Syria." The collapse of Assad's regime would
signify the loss of Moscow's last client and ally — and only
foothold — in the Middle East. Syria is seen as one
of the last symbolic remnants of Moscow's superpower status that
was the trademark of the Soviet Union. Western military
intervention in Syria would be a worst-case scenario because
the Kremlin would be practically powerless to prevent or resist this,
except for a veto in the United Nations Security Council.
There is
a generally pessimistic perception in Russia
of the consequences of the Arab Spring
for the Middle East as a whole,
and of the possible results of a Syrian revolution
in particular. Moscow considers secular authoritarian regimes to be
the only realistic alternative to radical Islamic influences
in Arab states. After many years of suffering
from Islamic-inspired terrorism and extremism in the North
Caucasus, Russian public opinion is on the side of Assad. Moscow
sees Assad not so much a bad dictator, but as a leader fighting
against an uprising of Islamic barbarism.
The active support
for the rebels fighting Assad from Saudi Arabia and Qatar
only reinforces Russia's deep suspicion of the Islamic character
of the Syrian insurgency. Russia has long been concerned about Saudi
Arabia's export of radical Wahhabi ideology across the Middle East
and beyond, including parts of the North Caucasus.
The final factor is
the Kremlin's traditional aversion to unilateral Western
interventionism. The latest example of this was the intervention
in Libya, which the West justified by broadly interpreting UN
Security Council resolutions and even violating those same resolutions
by arming Libyan rebels. Russia viewed U.S.-led Western actions
in Libya as cynical and deceitful, a typical display of its
double standards.
At the same
time, the violent conflict in Syria brings to the surface
all of the Kremlin's foreign policy fears, complexes
and phobias. These factors are more dominant in shaping Moscow's
policy toward Syria than the actual events on the ground there.
What's more, Putin, who has always tried to exploit such sentiments
for his own gain, is now burdened with the Russia's opposition
movement, which is pushing him to take an even firmer position
on Syria.
That position is not
based on a desire for profits from Russian weapons sales,
to preserve a presence at the Tartus port or even
to gain a bargaining chip with the United States. It is based
on the conviction that a revolution in Syria would inflict
serious damage on Russia's prestige and national interests,
particularly if the Syrian revolution is fueled by Western
and Arab governments.
Ruslan
Pukhov is director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies
and Technologies and publisher of the journal Moscow
Defense Brief.
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